2 - White House News in Chinese (weebly.com)
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program was an initiative housed within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The CTR program is better known as the Nunn–Lugar Act based on the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 which was authored and cosponsored by Sens. Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN). This Act was created in 1986 in a congressional meeting. According to the CTR website, "the purpose of the CTR Program is to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states." An alternative explanation of the program is "to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction in states of the former Soviet Union and beyond".[1]
CTR provides funding and expertise for states in the former Soviet Union (including Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan) to decommission nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon stockpiles, as agreed by the Soviet Union under disarmament treaties such as SALT I. This funding totaled $400 million a year for a total of four years. After the nuclear warheads were removed from their delivery vehicles by the post-Soviet successor militaries, Nunn-Lugar assistance provided equipment and supplies to destroy the missiles on which the warheads had been mounted, as well as the silos which had contained the missiles. The warheads themselves were then shipped to and destroyed in Russia, with the highly-enriched uranium contained within made into commercial reactor fuel; which was purchased by the United States under a separate program.
In recent years, the CTR program has expanded its mission from securing WMDs at the root source to protecting against WMD "on the move", by enhancing land and maritime border security in the former Soviet Union.
CTR provides funding and expertise for states in the former Soviet Union (including Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan) to decommission nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon stockpiles, as agreed by the Soviet Union under disarmament treaties such as SALT I. This funding totaled $400 million a year for a total of four years. After the nuclear warheads were removed from their delivery vehicles by the post-Soviet successor militaries, Nunn-Lugar assistance provided equipment and supplies to destroy the missiles on which the warheads had been mounted, as well as the silos which had contained the missiles. The warheads themselves were then shipped to and destroyed in Russia, with the highly-enriched uranium contained within made into commercial reactor fuel; which was purchased by the United States under a separate program.
In recent years, the CTR program has expanded its mission from securing WMDs at the root source to protecting against WMD "on the move", by enhancing land and maritime border security in the former Soviet Union.
New U.S. President Joe Biden is pitching a tough stance against Russia.
Biden Says No More U.S. 'Rolling Over' to Russia
Feb. 5 - President Joe Biden said Thursday the United States will no longer be "rolling over in the face of Russia's aggressive actions" and demanded release of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
In toughly worded remarks pivoting from his predecessor Donald Trump's muted approach to Moscow, Biden warned of "advancing authoritarianism" in China and Russia.
The speech at the State Department thrust Russia back onto the front burner of the U.S. diplomatic agenda after four years during which Trump largely pushed the worsening relationship with Moscow to the side and consistently refused to criticize Putin.
Biden said that in his first phone call with the Russian leader since taking office on January 20 he "made it clear" to Putin that the relationship was changing. source
Biden Says No More U.S. 'Rolling Over' to Russia
Feb. 5 - President Joe Biden said Thursday the United States will no longer be "rolling over in the face of Russia's aggressive actions" and demanded release of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
In toughly worded remarks pivoting from his predecessor Donald Trump's muted approach to Moscow, Biden warned of "advancing authoritarianism" in China and Russia.
The speech at the State Department thrust Russia back onto the front burner of the U.S. diplomatic agenda after four years during which Trump largely pushed the worsening relationship with Moscow to the side and consistently refused to criticize Putin.
Biden said that in his first phone call with the Russian leader since taking office on January 20 he "made it clear" to Putin that the relationship was changing. source
The Story Behind U.S. Access to Russian Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites
Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, nuclear security served as a common objective for the United States and Russia
A key question for the CTR nuclear security program is how Russia allowed access for teams to visit warhead storage sites that went beyond the verification measures of any previous nuclear arms control agreement. The answer is that the United States and Russia rallied around the mission of enhancing nuclear security. Leaders remained focused on encouragement, resources, patience, and support, opening the relationship to cooperation, while the staff was able to focus on the CTR nuclear security mission for years. The CTR Site Access story shows that negotiations do not have to be about extracting concessions but discovering common goals. It is critical to be up front and honest and to present positions consistently, explain the reasons, explain who and why.
Date Published on Feb. 4
It may be surprising to many that the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) nuclear security program attained access to Russian nuclear warhead storage sites that went beyond the verification measures of any previous nuclear arms control agreement.
Arms control treaties provide access for U.S. inspectors to military bases where nuclear delivery systems are deployed and, and under the INF treaty, there was portal monitoring of missile production facilities. Access to the nuclear warhead storage sites, however, where non-deployed tactical and strategic nuclear warheads are stored and maintained, was never authorized under any treaty or agreement – until CTR. These storage sites have long been regarded as among the most sensitive of Russian sites and have come under renewed attention in recent years as the United States and Russia have engaged in discussions on warhead limits. Under the CTR nuclear security program, however, the U.S. was provided unprecedented access to Russian nuclear warhead storage sites from 2003-2012.
So how did CTR program teams gain permission to visit, given the sites’ extreme sensitivity? The answer is that the objective of the CTR program was never to gain site access or gather intelligence on Russian nuclear weapons and weapons storage sites. The objective was to enhance nuclear security – and the United States and Russia were both strongly committed to achieving that goal. As the program matured and more work was needed at the sites, site access was required for the United States to provide installation services at those sites. Russia only approved site access for the purposes of improving nuclear security at their sites after they were convinced that the Americans were truly committed to achieving that goal and not pursuing ulterior intelligence-related motives.
“Secret” Russian Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Russia inherited the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world. Thousands of strategic and tactical warheads were housed in centralized storage facilities and bunkers located on nuclear weapons sites scattered across the former Soviet Union. continue to read
Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, nuclear security served as a common objective for the United States and Russia
A key question for the CTR nuclear security program is how Russia allowed access for teams to visit warhead storage sites that went beyond the verification measures of any previous nuclear arms control agreement. The answer is that the United States and Russia rallied around the mission of enhancing nuclear security. Leaders remained focused on encouragement, resources, patience, and support, opening the relationship to cooperation, while the staff was able to focus on the CTR nuclear security mission for years. The CTR Site Access story shows that negotiations do not have to be about extracting concessions but discovering common goals. It is critical to be up front and honest and to present positions consistently, explain the reasons, explain who and why.
Date Published on Feb. 4
It may be surprising to many that the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) nuclear security program attained access to Russian nuclear warhead storage sites that went beyond the verification measures of any previous nuclear arms control agreement.
Arms control treaties provide access for U.S. inspectors to military bases where nuclear delivery systems are deployed and, and under the INF treaty, there was portal monitoring of missile production facilities. Access to the nuclear warhead storage sites, however, where non-deployed tactical and strategic nuclear warheads are stored and maintained, was never authorized under any treaty or agreement – until CTR. These storage sites have long been regarded as among the most sensitive of Russian sites and have come under renewed attention in recent years as the United States and Russia have engaged in discussions on warhead limits. Under the CTR nuclear security program, however, the U.S. was provided unprecedented access to Russian nuclear warhead storage sites from 2003-2012.
So how did CTR program teams gain permission to visit, given the sites’ extreme sensitivity? The answer is that the objective of the CTR program was never to gain site access or gather intelligence on Russian nuclear weapons and weapons storage sites. The objective was to enhance nuclear security – and the United States and Russia were both strongly committed to achieving that goal. As the program matured and more work was needed at the sites, site access was required for the United States to provide installation services at those sites. Russia only approved site access for the purposes of improving nuclear security at their sites after they were convinced that the Americans were truly committed to achieving that goal and not pursuing ulterior intelligence-related motives.
“Secret” Russian Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Russia inherited the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world. Thousands of strategic and tactical warheads were housed in centralized storage facilities and bunkers located on nuclear weapons sites scattered across the former Soviet Union. continue to read
